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Joint Attribute and Model Generalization Learning for Privacy-Preserving Action Recognition

Neural Information Processing Systems

Privacy-Preserving Action Recognition (PPAR) aims to transform raw videos into anonymous ones to prevent privacy leakage while maintaining action clues, which is an increasingly important problem in intelligent vision applications. Despite recent efforts in this task, it is still challenging to deal with novel privacy attributes and novel privacy attack models that are unavailable during the training phase. In this paper, from the perspective of meta-learning (learning to learn), we propose a novel Meta Privacy-Preserving Action Recognition (MPPAR) framework to improve both generalization abilities above (i.e., generalize to and) in a unified manner. Concretely, we simulate train/test task shifts by constructing disjoint support/query sets w.r.t.


Adversarial Attacks on Deep Graph Matching

Neural Information Processing Systems

Despite achieving remarkable performance, deep graph learning models, such as node classification and network embedding, suffer from harassment caused by small adversarial perturbations. However, the vulnerability analysis of graph matching under adversarial attacks has not been fully investigated yet. This paper proposes an adversarial attack model with two novel attack techniques to perturb the graph structure and degrade the quality of deep graph matching: (1) a kernel density estimation approach is utilized to estimate and maximize node densities to derive imperceptible perturbations, by pushing attacked nodes to dense regions in two graphs, such that they are indistinguishable from many neighbors; and (2) a meta learning-based projected gradient descent method is developed to well choose attack starting points and to improve the search performance for producing effective perturbations. We evaluate the effectiveness of the attack model on real datasets and validate that the attacks can be transferable to other graph learning models.


Provably Efficient Black-Box Action Poisoning Attacks Against Reinforcement Learning

Neural Information Processing Systems

Due to the broad range of applications of reinforcement learning (RL), understanding the effects of adversarial attacks against RL model is essential for the safe applications of this model. Prior theoretical works on adversarial attacks against RL mainly focus on either reward poisoning attacks or environment poisoning attacks. In this paper, we introduce a new class of attacks named action poisoning attacks, where an adversary can change the action signal selected by the agent. Compared with existing attack models, the attacker's ability in the proposed action poisoning attack model is more restricted, which brings some design challenges. We study the action poisoning attack in both white-box and black-box settings. We introduce an adaptive attack scheme called LCB-H, which works for most RL agents in the black-box setting. We prove that LCB-H attack can force any efficient RL agent, whose dynamic regret scales sublinearly with the total number of steps taken, to choose actions according to a policy selected by the attacker very frequently, with only sublinear cost. In addition, we apply LCB-H attack against a very popular model-free RL algorithm: UCB-H. We show that, even in black-box setting, by spending only logarithm cost, the proposed LCB-H attack scheme can force the UCB-H agent to choose actions according to the policy selected by the attacker very frequently.


Unlearning Inversion Attacks for Graph Neural Networks

Zhang, Jiahao, Wang, Yilong, Zhang, Zhiwei, Liu, Xiaorui, Wang, Suhang

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Graph unlearning methods aim to efficiently remove the impact of sensitive data from trained GNNs without full retraining, assuming that deleted information cannot be recovered. In this work, we challenge this assumption by introducing the graph unlearning inversion attack: given only black-box access to an unlearned GNN and partial graph knowledge, can an adversary reconstruct the removed edges? We identify two key challenges: varying probability-similarity thresholds for unlearned versus retained edges, and the difficulty of locating unlearned edge endpoints, and address them with TrendAttack. First, we derive and exploit the confidence pitfall, a theoretical and empirical pattern showing that nodes adjacent to unlearned edges exhibit a large drop in model confidence. Second, we design an adaptive prediction mechanism that applies different similarity thresholds to unlearned and other membership edges. Our framework flexibly integrates existing membership inference techniques and extends them with trend features. Experiments on four real-world datasets demonstrate that TrendAttack significantly outperforms state-of-the-art GNN membership inference baselines, exposing a critical privacy vulnerability in current graph unlearning methods.


Membership Inference Attack against Large Language Model-based Recommendation Systems: A New Distillation-based Paradigm

Cuihong, Li, Xiaowen, Huang, Chuanhuan, Yin, Jitao, Sang

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Membership Inference Attack (MIA) aims to determine whether a specific data sample was included in the training dataset of a target model. Traditional MIA approaches rely on shadow models to mimic target model behavior, but their effectiveness diminishes for Large Language Model (LLM)- based recommendation systems due to the scale and complexity of training data. This paper introduces a novel knowledge distillation-based MIA paradigm tailored for LLM-based recommendation systems. Our method constructs a reference model via distillation, applying distinct strategies for member and non-member data to enhance discriminative capabilities. The paradigm extracts fused features (e.g., confidence, entropy, loss, and hidden layer vectors) from the reference model to train an attack model, overcoming limitations of individual features. Extensive experiments on extended datasets (Last.FM, MovieLens, Book-Crossing, Delicious) and diverse LLMs (T5, GPT -2, LLaMA3) demonstrate that our approach significantly outperforms shadow model-based MIAs and individual-feature baselines. The results show its practicality for privacy attacks in LLM-driven recommender systems.


Privacy Auditing of Multi-domain Graph Pre-trained Model under Membership Inference Attacks

Luo, Jiayi, Sun, Qingyun, Wei, Yuecen, Yuan, Haonan, Fu, Xingcheng, Li, Jianxin

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Multi-domain graph pre-training has emerged as a pivotal technique in developing graph foundation models. While it greatly improves the generalization of graph neural networks, its privacy risks under membership inference attacks (MIAs), which aim to identify whether a specific instance was used in training (member), remain largely unexplored. However, effectively conducting MIAs against multi-domain graph pre-trained models is a significant challenge due to: (i) Enhanced Generalization Capability: Multi-domain pre-training reduces the overfitting characteristics commonly exploited by MIAs. (ii) Unrepresentative Shadow Datasets: Diverse training graphs hinder the obtaining of reliable shadow graphs. (iii) Weakened Membership Signals: Embedding-based outputs offer less informative cues than logits for MIAs. To tackle these challenges, we propose MGP-MIA, a novel framework for Membership Inference Attacks against Multi-domain Graph Pre-trained models. Specifically, we first propose a membership signal amplification mechanism that amplifies the overfitting characteristics of target models via machine unlearning. We then design an incremental shadow model construction mechanism that builds a reliable shadow model with limited shadow graphs via incremental learning. Finally, we introduce a similarity-based inference mechanism that identifies members based on their similarity to positive and negative samples. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed MGP-MIA and reveal the privacy risks of multi-domain graph pre-training.